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“This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20 years, ” remarked Marshal of France and
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies Ferdinand Foch at the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919, which officially put an end to the First World War. His words would come
true with the beginning of World War Two in 1939, when Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler and
the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin invaded Poland on two fronts. Despite the short-lived time
of peace between the two World Wars, the end of World War One and the two decades that
followed were crucial to the course of world and European history. Politically, the interwar era
saw the transformation of old empires into new republics, and from republics to dictatorships;
artistically, the previously fringe modernist movements had their day in the spotlight, radically
reshaping the mainstream of visual art, literature, and architecture; and economically, the
collapse of the classical capitalist model rapidly reshaped economic and social classes, and gave
rise to new methods in combating monetary crises.
There is perhaps no nation that demonstrates all three aspects of interwar change better
than Germany. The promising new republic established among the ashes of the old German
Empire reorganized itself into one of the most terrifying fascist states in recent history; the
myriad of modernist schools that rose to the forefront of international fame were scattered by the
Nazi movement; and finally, the domestic and global economic crises created waves of terror
and uncertainty within the Weimar population, and directly led to the eventual capitulation of the
new state and society. The hyperinflation between 1921 and 1933, and the Great Depression of
1929, presented very different challenges to the Weimar government and public. While the
hyperinflation resulted in the immediate depreciation of currency, the Depression caused mass
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unemployment, and led to the quick rise of radical groups on both sides of the political spectrum,
culminating in the Nazi Party’s coming to power in 1933. It is impossible to understand Hitler’s
regime and World War Two without a comprehensive understanding of the economic crises of
1920s Germany, although historians do not all agree as to the exact inner workings of the
causation effect between the events. German historians use the word “Sonderweg” (special path)
to describe the unique trajectory of Germany’s past, its uneasy road to modern democracy, and
2

especially its role in the devastation of World War Two and the Holocaust. While some writers
have pointed to as early as Martin Luther’s time as the foreshadowing to the Nazi regime, others
such as Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn have come to the conclusion that the history of
Germany was not so inevitable, and is in fact multi-causal and incidental in many of its stages.
As a crucial watershed moment in the history of the development of democracy in
Germany, the fall of the Weimar Republic is naturally an important point of contention between
different historians and schools of thought. In particular, the two economic crises suffered by the
Weimar populace have been researched and debated by generations of historians looking at the
same event through different lenses. Scholarship on the rise of Nazism and the personality of
Adolf Hitler existed, naturally, before the start of World War Two, but the six years of renewed
warfare - one that overshadowed the previous desolation in terms of scale and brutality - made
the same story even more intriguing for scholars and the general public alike. However, despite
the seemingly endless stream of materials on Nazi Germany itself, the amount of scholarly work
regarding the Weimar Republic that preceded it pales in comparison. In the few decades after the
end of World War Two, one of the most influential works on the phenomenon was The Rise and

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York, NY:
Simon and Schuster, 1960).
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Fall of the Third Reich, written by American journalist William L. Shirer and published in 1960.
Shirer, who witnessed these events first hand, had access to captured German documents after
the capitulation of Nazi Germany, and had had fifteen years since the end of the war to reflect on
the history of it all, almost omitted the Weimar Republic altogether. “On the very eve of the birth
3

of the Third Reich a feverish tension gripped Berlin,” reads the first sentence of the monograph,
followed by the following: “The Weimar Republic, it seemed obvious to almost everyone, was
4

about to expire.” With his work, Shirer introduced the concept of Sonderweg, and the belief in
the inevitability of Nazi Germany shared by Shirer and other scholars meant that the Weimar
Republic was not important. If the development of Nazism in Germany was inevitable, then the
Weimar democracy was destined to fail. Indeed, Shirer claimed that “the Republic, on the very
5

day of its birth, was lost.”

In time, however, Shirer’s almost fatalistic view of German history was challenged by
subsequent historians, who presented vastly different explanations to the rise of Nazism, many of
which were deeply rooted in the various aspects of the Weimar Republic. While there were many
theories regarding the demise of democracy in interwar Germany, most scholars agreed that the
hyperinflation between 1921 and 1923, as well as the Great Depression of 1929, were essential
pieces to solving the puzzle. In the decades following the end of World War Two, most analyses
of these phenomenon were done in the vein of economic history, which primarily investigated
the causes and cures of the economic crises These works largely ignored the more complex
sociopolitical elements to the story, as well as the individuals who lived through this era. As time
passed, the scope of study has been expanded by historians with different focuses. With the
3
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emergence of the “history from below” movement, historians began to pay more attention to the
people that experienced first hand the rise and fall of Weimar democracy. These researches and
scholarly works present the short-lived Weimar Republic in a new light, and gave those that
lived through it - and the era itself - agency, rather than a helpless victim doomed to fail from the
start.
The end of the First World War in 1918 saw the fall of the old European empires and the
rise of new regimes. With the downfall of the German Empire after the overthrow of Kaiser
Wilhelm II, the establishment of the new Weimar Republic saw many new opportunities and
challenges. One of the most daunting challenges faced by the new regime was the rebuilding of
the national economy, after the drastic downsizing of the workforce from the war, the destruction
of institution, and the punitive reparations by the victors in the Treaty of Versaille. It is not
surprising, then, that the Weimar years saw numerous economic crises during its short fifteen
years. In the year of 1921, Germany suffered hyperinflation from the mass printing of money,
and the 1928 Great Depression in the U.S. crippled German economy through deflation.
The early years of research after this series of events were focused almost exclusively on
the economic aspects of the era, seen most intently in The Collapse of the Weimar Republic:
Political Economy and Crisis by historian David Abraham and published in 1981.6 With his
research and analysis, Abraham attempted to better understand the economic structure and
interactions of the Weimar Republic, as well as to establish a connection between them and the
rise of Nazi Germany. In his monograph, David Abraham analyzed the economic situation of the
Weimar Republic during the 1920s, and the reasons for the failure of the national economy, and

David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1981).
6
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the downfall of the interwar democracy itself. Abraham began with his analysis of the Weimar
society itself, followed by the interactions between its various sectors. As a prime example of
economic history, the book naturally has a strong focus on economic structure, as well as on the
businesses and industries that formed the very same structure.
The Collapse of the Weimar Republic d id not focus on the political or industrial elites, but
instead on the economy itself. While of course it is close to impossible not to mention important
historical figures such as Paul von Hindenburg or Adolf Hitler when dealing with the fall of the
Weimar Republic, the incorporation of “great men” in Abraham’s book was mostly for setting
the stage for the interactions between the industries. As such, it is apparent that this monograph
is not an example of what is generally known as “political history,” which revolves almost
entirely around “the formal organization of power in society, which for the majority of human
7

societies in recorded history means the state.” In contrast, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic
has more similarities with social history, as he closely analyzed the importance of various groups
within the Weimar Republic, a theme in the writing of history that took inspiration from the
writings and philosophies of Karl Marx. Like most social historians, Abraham was greatly
interested in the various socio-economic classes, and how their interactions influenced the
Weimar economy. Abraham was also interested in the political parties present in the Weimar
Republic, of which there were many. In his book, he used the political parties in the national
parliament a s an indication of the strength and influence of different social classes, depending on
whose interests they represented. In his analyses, the German Communist Party was used to
represent the working class, while more conservative political parties represented the dominance
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of aristocrats and industrialists. This is an unusual method of utilizing a top-down method to
understand the entirety of the German population, and while information drawn from this
comparison is both easier to acquire and to make comparisons, it is also very general and perhaps
not entirely accurate to assume that economic status was the only important factor to one’s
political affiliation. As such, it reflects a blend of both diplomatic and social history: a work of
political history without the elites, and a work of social history without the people.
While Abraham chose to veer away from the “great men” of history in the writing of his
8

book, he was not exactly operate in the vein of the “history from below” trend that permeated
the social and cultural history schools by researching and writing about the common people
during times of historical change. Instead, he specifically focused on industries, and how the
capitalist economic system created the inter-sectional interactions that made the
coming-to-power of the Nazi Party a reality.This intense focus on the system itself could be seen
from the chapters themselves. Beyond the initial analysis of the social classes (an analysis
signature to social and Marxist historians), the book is broken down to focus on the interactions
within and between the agricultural and industrial sectors, and one short chapter of what
9

Abraham referred to as “the reemergence of the labor/capital conflict.” In this respect, The
Collapse of the Weimar Republic i s clearly primarily a work of economic history, a
historiographical school which attempts to “explain societies holistically while working on
10

data… which raises fresh questions about past societies.” Abraham was not very interested in
the workers of the industries, but the industries themselves, and that is a component that sets him
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apart from the mainstream social historians, while even though they are often guilty of reducing
11

individuals to their class, are interested in the common people. While the author claims that
“the bulk of this work has been concerned with the various conflicts within and between the
12

dominant class fractions,” it is evident that he utilized the concept of “class” in a sense very
much different from most social historians, one that is concerned of class without its human
elements. Even in the chapter regarding the labor/capital conflict, the classic Marxist rhetoric of
exploitation and the control over means of production, Abraham chose not to acknowledge the
conditions of workers, and instead only wrote about industrial regulation and legislation. As
such, while David Abraham’s work shares similarities with Marxist and social history, its
primary focus on economic history still takes precedence, with the other forms of historiography
used when necessary only as a supplement to the former.
As a work of economic history, there should be no surprise that economic data was the
most important form of evidence utilized in David Abraham’s monograph. In Abraham’s The
Collapse of the Weimar Republic, Abraham closely analyzed the material output of the
industries, and utilized the statistics as pivotal evidence to support his argument. In the chapter
regarding conflicts within the agricultural sector, for example, Abraham made use of the gross
13

production, net production, gross import, net import, as well as the prices of 1924 to 1930.

Later in the chapter, the author broke down agricultural production into the individual sectors, in
14

order to see the differences in the trends of prices between the different products.  In this aspect,
this book fits straight into the tradition of economic history. In addition, the use of quantitative
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data is also an important aspect of social history, which seeks to understand group dynamics
without focusing on any one individual within their respective groups.
It should be noted, that while economic historians do indeed focus on the economy and
15

businesses in their research and analyses, they are usually not only interested in money.

Instead, they often use mathematical analysis in order to form questions that resonate with
themes larger than the economy itself, and attempt to answer them using quantitative data. For
Abraham, the question could be summarized as “how did the Nazi Party attain power in the
Weimar Republic?” And to answer this question, Abraham utilized multiple models to explain
the Weimar economy, an integral piece of the Weimar society. The Collapse of the Weimar
Republic m
 akes it clear that David Abraham was convinced that the capitalist system was
responsible for the rise of Hitler and Nazi Germany, and the book is devoid of any discussion of
other possible causes. While most historians would agree with Abraham, that the instability of
the economy influenced the people of Germany and pushed the public towards more fringe
movements like Nazism, they would also argue that there were many other causes. Essential
themes of this time period, such as nationalism, anti-semitism, international relationships, and
internal political struggles were not present in this monograph. While these aspects of interwar
Germany were obviously not the focus for David Abraham in the writing of this book, their
complete omission in the discussion of the Nazi Party’s coming to power still presents a
problem. In what can be gleaned from The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, Abraham believes
that the class division within the national economy of the Weimar Republic was the sole culprit
of the downfall of the political structure.

15
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While David Abraham was convinced with the central role of the capitalist economic
system in the downfall of the Weimar Empire as well as his methodology that resulted in The
Collapse of the Weimar Republic ( 1981), his work also became very controversial with his
fellow historians of modern Germany. Historians Henry Turner and Gerald Feldman, among
others, questioned the models used by Abraham in coming to his conclusions, as well as
accusations that he possibly edited primary sources in order to fit into his narrative. The pressure
presented to Abraham from the academic community forced him to go into a lengthy period of
re-editing his work, eventually resulting in a second edition that was published in 1986.
However, while most scholars acknowledge that the revised book was a vast improvement over
his original manuscript, many historians still took issue with this new edition. In particular, Peter
Hayes from Northwestern University claimed that many issues still lingered, and published his
article regarding the new publication in The Business History Review. In his review, Hayes
criticized the amount of remaining errors in citations and attribution, but most importantly, the
reductionist analysis for the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazi Germany, in place
16

of a “complex, multicausal explanation.”

Of course, not every work of economic history necessarily followed the same
methodology or came to the same conclusion as David Abraham did, and even those that wrote
and published during his own time offered different interpretations of the same Weimar
economy. In 1986 (as opposed to 1981 when Abraham published his work), historian William C.
McNeil published his work regarding the Weimar economy, titled American Money and the

Peter Hayes. "History in an Off Key: David Abraham's Second "Collapse"," The Business History
Review 61, no. 3 (1987), 455.
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Weimar Republic: Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression. 17 It is evident just
from the title, that McNeil operated with a wider scope than Abraham did, as it went broader
than just the German economy, and expanded the scope to also include the United States. While
World War One created immense animosity between different nations, the end of the war also
saw the emergence of a world more connected than ever before. As David Abraham concluded
that the rise of Nazism was solely due to the capitalist structure of the Weimar Republic,
McNeil’s monograph provides a link between Germany and the United States, giving more
explanations to Germany’s historical trajectory that historians like Hayes believed were lacking
from Abraham’s work.
In this monograph, William C. McNeal examined the role American capital played in the
history of the Weimar Republic, and the roots of this phenomenon stretched to the First World
War itself. While the United States did not officially participate in World War One until April of
1917, it had been funding the Entente nations’ war effort since much earlier. And as the
European continent lay in ruins after the war, the only way that the U.S. government and
businesses could recover their expenses during the war was through the German war reparations,
given to the allied states such as Great Britain and France, and then back to the United States - an
amount that Germany was also not able to pay. It was for this reason American bankers decided
18

to continue to inject capital into Germany in what was called the Dawes Plan in 1924, shortly
after the end of the Weimar hyperinflation. The Dawes Plan created and sustained a cash flow
that goes from the United States to Germany in the form of investment, from Germany to Great
Britain and France in the form of reparations, and from Britain and France back to the United
William C. McNeil, American Money and the Weimar Republic: Economics and Politics on the Eve of
the Great Depression (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986).
18
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States to pay back wartime loans. From the Dawes Plan to its replacement, the Young Plan,
American funding became integral to Germany’s economic recovery during the interwar era.
American capital funded the building of infrastructure, industrial output, as well as cultural and
artistic production. Despite its prominent role in the recovery of the German economy, American
money also created new tensions. McNeil provided a counterpoint to the influx of American
capital that benefited the German economy, and noted some of the negative impacts of such
investments. In particular, he believed that the injection of American loans exacerbated domestic
conflicts, as different groups fought bitterly over how the money should be properly used within
19

the German economy. Conservative forces, according to McNeil, wished to allocate the capital
into industrial output in the private sector, while the left-wing advocated for the money to be
spent on government funded public programs such as gas, electricity, and public housing
projects. One seemingly simple act of increasing the pay for government employees, for
20

example, quickly became a bitter debate over its pros and cons. The effects on the national and
local level for an increase in salaries, the amount of the pay increase, and the effects it could
have on the cost of living, all became heated topics of discussion. Even within the same party,
different members and groups differed on theirs stances, creating even more confusion and
21

conflict due to a drastic increase in budget. The conflicts of interest was not only present on the
domestic level. The victors of World War One pressured the Weimar Republic into paying more
reparations at a faster rate, instead of spending the American investment in domestic economy,
creating even more disagreements and conflicts of interest as a direct result of the extra money.
McNeil argued that while the American capital seemingly alleviated both internal and external
19
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tension put on the Weimar government by offering a larger sum of money for the national
budget, it was never going to be a long-term solution as it did not truly resolve the conflicts
already present in German society. The Dawes Plan and the subsequent Young Plan might have
stabilized the Weimar economy after the hyperinflation, but it also exacerbated the existing
divides between the various socioeconomic classes, and polarized the political situation in
Germany.
In his research, McNeil utilized a two-pronged method in locating evidence for his
analysis. Similar to David Abraham in The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, McNeil scrutinized
the quantitative data available to him that could explain the status of the Weimar economy. In
particular, American Money and the Weimar Republic p resented the economic aspect of his
research with the analysis of the business cycle as well as the reparations payment schedule.

22

With this information, McNeil was able to present a clear picture on the economic status of
Weimar Germany at a certain point, and to corroborate any changes with socio-political changes
23

within the nation. In order to make this corroboration, the author also presented the readers
with a large selection of primary materials which shed light on the political atmosphere within
the Weimar Republic and the relationship between Germany and the United States. Materials
from the German political archive (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, shortened as AA
in the bibliography), and correspondence between the leading figures within the realm of
24

banking that heavily influenced German economy during this era, such as J.P. Morgan himself.
The difference between the usage of primary evidence between David Abraham and

William C. McNeil represents a larger difference between the ways the two historians looked at
22
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the Weimar economy, and how the very different scopes they operated under while only being
five years apart. David Abraham focused intently on the Weimar economy itself, and presented
an explanation for the downfall of the Weimar Republic that was exclusively contained in the
economic aspect of this era. While his research and analysis are both sound and well supported
with evidence, a large part of the story was also omitted in his narrative. McNeil, in comparison,
was much more rounded in his monograph. While American Money and the Weimar Republic
was still a work of economic history, first and foremost, it also presents its readers a broader
spectrum of causes and effects. William C. McNeil acknowledged the importance of both
domestic politics and international diplomacy in the shaping of the Weimar economy, and in the
process presented a multicausal explanation to the downfall of the Weimar democracy.
As both historians published their works of scholarship during the Cold War, an era of
hostility on a global scale between two opposing political and economic systems, it is not
surprising that economic history would be one of the most important schools of historiography
during this era. However, in addition to the scopes of their works, their conclusions also differ
from one another, and fit well into the debate between capitalism and communism that was
thematic for the Cold War era. David Abraham argued that the system of capitalism was the
primary cause for the fall of the Weimar Republic, and that capitalism itself led to the rise of
Hitler and Nazi Germany. While William C. McNeil did not directly argue against this
conclusion, his emphasis on the complexity of the entire situation, especially the preexisting
conflicts within the German society, shows that he did not believe that capitalism was the only
cause.

14

Although titled American Money and the Weimar Republic, William C. McNeil’s
monograph focused more on the internal politics within Germany. While the author examined
the world outside of Germany, he also treated Germany as the center of the interwar
phenomenon, instead of a part of a grander world economy. In 1990, German historian
Hans-Joachim Braun published The German Economy in the Twentieth Century: The German
Reich and the Federal Republic, 25 and complemented McNeil and his complex, multicausal
explanation for the Weimar economy, while still working within the realm of economic history.
In this book, Braun followed closely the lineage of the various German governments, and
examined the reservoir of reasons that sent Germany and its people down the Sonderweg.
As a work that examines an entire century of Germany’s history, The German Economy
in the Twentieth Century puts the economic situation of the Weimar Republic within context of a
Germany (and Europe) after the devastation of the First World War, and not within a vacuum in
terms of either time or space. Other than the decisions made by the Weimar government and the
interactions within the free market system, Braun also noted the changes in the amount of labor
and natural resources as a result of the German involvement in the war. In contrast to the final
stages of World War One, the beginning of the interwar era saw the departure of “about 873,000
prisoners of war and 360,000 foreign civil workers,” while supplemented by “almost ten million
German soldiers” and “an additional one million German prisoners of war from the summer of
26

1919 onwards.” The author emphasized that Weimar Germany was not an enclosed system that
was only influenced by itself (similar to how McNeil treated the same material), but a part of a
larger economy that was very much influenced by the economics and politics of other states, and
Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century: The German Reich and the
Federal Republic (New York, NY: Routeledge, 2003).
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one whose problems rooted in the events of early twentieth century Europe. According to Braun,
the individuals that inhabited the Weimar Republic were not solely to blame for the economic
crises of the 1920’s. Various entities of the old German Empire as well as the members of other
states also contributed to the situation that led to the hyperinflation that Germany suffered
through. Especially in the context of the Great Depression, Braun emphasized on the
helplessness of German individuals and institutions against the juggernaut of the economic crisis.
27

“Generally, the German banks could not cope with the withdrawals of American deposits.” In
this sense, Germany and its inhabitants were not only not completely responsible for their crises,
there was also little they could have done in the situation not created by themselves. The analysis
present in The German Economy in the Twentieth Century shows the complexity of the Weimar
economy as a multicausal phenomenon that no one party was solely responsible for, and no
single solution was available that could have dealt with all of the problems.
Similar to The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, Braun took a top-down view of the
Weimar economy. In his analysis of the economy, the author focused on the economic system
and its interactions, and not on the individuals who lived under the system. Within the realms of
economics, Braun noted especially the importance of government leaders in the crises of the
1920’s. In the section regarding the hyperinflation of 1923, for example, the role of Matthias
Erzberger as the minister of finance of Germany was discussed in detail within the book, and his
decisions in policy making was considered by the author to be one of the major driving forces
behind the economic situation. When “at the end of 1919 he introduced taxes on property gains
28

during the war the most important of which was the ‘Reichemergency contribution,’” it

27
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presents the importance of national leaders in the trajectory of national economy and national
history. This aspect is very much different from the approach of David Abraham, who while also
viewed the Weimar economy from the top in terms of the grand economy, did not care much
about the policy makers themselves. In contrast, Braun noted the importance of the individual
national leaders and their roles in shaping the economy, rather than Abraham’s model of the
economy as a self-sufficient system that runs without the need for human interaction. Other than
individual members of the government, Braun also emphasized the role of the government
bureaucracy as a whole in its influence on the economy, instead of the individuals who inhabited
and participated in the market on a day-to-day basis.
Braun also made use of the social history strand, which focuses on the groups of people
within history and tries to present the lives of the common people that lived within different eras.
Despite not having the powers and authority of kings or other social elites, the daily business of
the ruled also drove history in profound ways that should not be understated. In trying to
decipher the meaning behind the stagnant productions of the late 1920’s, Braun analyzed the
dominant social trends of better labor benefits as a major influence over the increase of
production costs, thus resulting in less national industrial output. In order to illustrate this point,
Braun compared the proportions of national income that the working class had within the same
decade, and concluded that “between 1924 and 1929 wages rose fast and generally surpassed the
29

growth rates of industrial output.” While Braun argued that the conglomeration of workers had
a tremendous ripple effect that significantly raised the cost of production and reduced gross
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national product during the Weimar Republic, his methodology and analysis shows that he did
not think that any individual worker had any significant amount of sway that could alter history.
Hans-Joachim Braun and David Abraham share many similarities in their writings. They
were both mostly interested in the top-down perspective of national economy and the
interactions within individual industries. However, while Abraham viewed the Weimar economy
as an autonomous system that functioned on its own through class divisions without individual
output or human interactions, Braun believed that the German government and the individual
personalities played an important role in the unique trajectory of its national economy.
Furthermore, while Abraham attributed the economic crises and the downfall of the Weimar
Republic to the class divisions and ever growing capitalist system, Braun believed that there
were numerous causes for this development including the aftermath of World War One, as well
as the global economy outside of what Germany and its leaders were capable of controlling. In
that respect, Braun shares many similarities with William C. McNeil in terms of their arguments.
Although their methodologies differ from one another, and Braun operated with a scope much
grander than McNeil did in terms of time, they both believed that the economic situation of the
Weimar Republic was a highly complex issue. The leaders of the Weimar regime, the
socio-political divide in both the parliament and among the general population, as well as the
looming threat of external pressure, all influenced the German republic on its path to destruction.
Braun published his monograph in 1990. The year before saw the fall of the Berlin Wall.
One year later, the Soviet Union collapsed, formally putting an end to the Cold War. As the end
of the Cold War greatly attributed to the “delegitimation of the Marxist paradigm,”30 historians

Winter, Jay and Antoine Prost. “Three Historiographical Configurations,” in The Great War in History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 26.
30
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began to deviate from Marxists’ fixation on economic and social history. While it might have
been hard to imagine a way to examine the history of the Weimar economy other than through
economic history, a new wave of historians in fact took many new approaches to the same
subject. In the couple of decades after the end of the Cold War, historians have examined the
Weimar economy through the lens of cultural history, as a part of an ongoing internal conflict
within Germany, and as an example of the Weimar government’s active attempts to salvage itself
from the onslaught of domestic and international plights.
The advent of cultural history was perhaps one of the most important developments in the
realm of historiography in the last century, as historians began to examine and analyze historical
events through the eyes of individuals that lived in the past. In 2001, Bernd Widdig applied this
new method and historical philosophy to the history of the Weimar economy, in his book Culture
and Inflation in Weimar Germany by Bernd Widdig.31 As the title suggests, this monograph
primarily focuses on the culture of the Weimar people as the nation plummeted into economic
crises.
One of the major differences between Widdig and the three aforementioned historians
and their works of economic history is that he was not at all interested in why and how the
hyperinflation took place. While Abraham, McNeil, and Braun disagreed on the causes of the
economic crises in the Weimar Republic, and who or what was truly responsible for them, to
Widdig it was of no consequence. To the common people, how the chaos came to be was not
important, and had no effect on how they lived their lives coping with the crises. Having
experienced both World Wars and the Weimar hyperinflation, the author’s grandfather was not

Bernd Widdig, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany. Weimar and Now (Berkeley: University of
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able to provide a reason for how it came to. “It had just happened, and it had been terrible.” It
did not matter to the citizens of the Weimar republic how the hyperinflation began; instead, the
most important question to the general public was how to cope with it. In his first chapter,
Widdig quickly laid out the historical background of the hyperinflation - not the causes of the
33

inflation, but the events that would be experienced by the everyday person. In order for the
(presumably primarily American) readers of the new century to be able to connect with the
people that lived in a historical era, Widdig also made reference to the economic crisis in the
United States during the Carter administration, inviting the readers to find empathy with the
34

historical figures. Widdig provided information regarding the leadership of the Weimar
Republic (an example of political history) and the social classes within Germany (an example of
social history), but neither was the focus of his work. The author made quick mentions of such
top-down historical information merely as a backdrop so that the readers could understand what
the German population was facing, and instead emphasized on the reactions of the people faced
with this tremendous challenge.
35

As an example of cultural history, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany focuses on
culture and individual experience, and Bernd Widdig examined memory and artistic expressions
of the German people. While not the research focus of his monograph, Widdig started with the
memories of his grandfather. In fact, it was his grandfather’s recollections of wheelbarrows full
36

of cash that started his interest in this era. His grandfather represents the subject of Widdig’s
research: the common people who experienced the hyperinflation, and had to react and cope with
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the situation in their own unique methods. Widdig gave the individuals their own individuality
and agency in living their lives, in contrast to the generalization of how the collective German
population suffered from the hyperinflation, as social historians might. Of course, some
economic historians such as David Abraham would almost completely omit the story of the
working class, favoring focus on the grand economic structure instead. Culture and Inflation in
Weimar Germany is, however, not a work of Alltagsgeschichte.37 It does not focus on the
everyday life of German citizens and how it was changed by the inflation. While Widdig made
passing mentions to the massive amount of money that needed to purchase most everyday
38

objects, as well as how the worthlessness of paper money changed simple activities such as
39

playing, it was never truly the focus of the book or any individual chapter. Instead, the
monograph alternates between cultural/artistic production and personal experiences, still
grounded within the cultural history stream, but without focusing on the history of everyday life.
While Bernd Widdig operated within the tradition of cultural history, he still employed
much of social history’s methodology in the early chapters of his book. Under “Part Two:
Money,” Widdig utilized not only the materialistic analysis of social historians, but heavily
referred to the theories of Karl Marx. Widdig commented on the sheer power of money within
human society. “Next to language, money is the most important medium through which modern
40

societies communicate.” He commented on the problems that come with such a power, and
made use of Marx to reinforce his own analyses, although Widdig also disagrees with some of
Marx’s assessments on the boundaries of money’s powers. Nevertheless, the author agrees with
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Marx that money carries great power and value due to the capitalist consumer economy, and the
amount and variety of goods and services that could be bought with money. “Indeed, money in
41

many ways constitutes the way we conceptualize the world and ourselves.” Despite having the
third configuration as his primary focus, Bernd Widdig utilized social history and Marxist
analysis to portray the importance of money to the population living within a capitalist economy,
especially during a monetary crisis as sever and the Weimar hyperinflation.
In his monograph, Bernd Widdig also presents gender as an important factor to take into
consideration within the context of the Weimar hyperinflation, referring to it as “a powerful
rhetorical strategy to mark basic struc-tures of difference such as the private and the public,
42

authenticity and alienation, nature and society, desire and rationality.” Within Culture and
Inflation in Weimar Germany, Widdig only focused on the issue of gender in one chapter.
However, he emphasized the importance of gender, and analyzed how the role of women had
changed due to the hyperinflation. “Mothers begging for their starving children, all these
43

prostitutes on the streets,” according to Widdig, was a common perception by the German
people that lived through the Weimar economic crises. In order to feed their children, women
with the role of mothers had to turn to vastly different means. While women remained dependent
44

45

on the agricultural production capabilities of the nation as they did during World War One,
they also benefited from the war and were able to enter into jobs they would not have been

allowed before the start of the war. However, their deviation from traditional norms were also
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seen as a negative by the mainstream society, and have been blamed in various cultural mediums
as the cause of the inflation, in accordance to a long history of representing disasters in a
46

feminine fashion. While not the focus of the entire book, issues of gender was identified by
Bernd Widdig as an important factor within the memory and portrayal of the hyperinflation, and
shows heavy influence from the women’s history and gender history schools of thought.
Bernd Widdig provided a cultural history view of the Weimar hyperinflation that is very
different from the more traditional narratives of the economic crises. While he did not underplay
the importance of money within the capitalist economic system, he focused on the individual
experiences and cultural production that came to be as a result of the economic crises. He
utilized second configuration information as well as Marxist rhetoric to analyze the Weimar
economy, yet also veered away from the generalized and materialistic methodology commonly
used by social and Marxist historians. While not an Alltagsgeschichte w
 ork that deals with the
everyday life of Weimar citizens, Widdig was still influenced by the various schools of thought
that trace their roots to the “history from below” movement. Although not the central focus of his
monograph, his chapter on the female experience and the perception of women during the
hyperinflation was an example of gender history, creating more distinctions and dichotomies to
analyze and understand this period in history.
With the previously mentioned monographs, as well as the predominant teachings of the
era, the Weimar Republic had almost always been seen as a passive victim throughout its almost
twenty years of existence. The Weimar Republic was created through the demise of the old
German Empire, according to the mainstream historians, and throughout its existence gradually
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crumpled against the chaos left in the wake of World War One, besieged on all fronts by the
intense conflict between the left and right wing forces within both the parliament and the general
population. In these narratives, the regime itself, as well as the leading members of the
government, had no agency, and were generally portrayed as being at the mercy of the
Communists and the Nazis. However, there are also historians that have argued against this
narrative, (and this does sound strange) empowering the Weimar government in the story of its
own demise. In 2014, historian Anthony McElligott published his work, Rethinking the Weimar
Republic: Authority and Authoritarianism, 1916-1939.47 One of the most recent historical works
to day, this monograph presents the Weimar regime in a brand new light.
Anthony McElligott argued that, like all governments and regimes, the Weimar
government strived to garner the support of its citizens, and in order to achieve this goal, actively
designed and altered its policies in order to appeal to the various demographics within Germany.
Beginning with the First World War, McElligott retraced the collapse of the German Empire in
48

what he referred to as the “erosion of authority,” resulting in distrust of government, civil
unrest, and eventually revolutions that not only put an end to the Hohenzollern monarchy, but
49

also altered the government-people dynamic for the decades to come. In Rethinking the Weimar
Republic, McElligott focused mainly on four aspects of the Weimar government: diplomacy,
economics, law, and culture. With all these aspects, the author reinforced the idea that the
government was by far not the helpless victim popularly envisioned by the population, but
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instead a potent political force that requires serious consideration as it fought for its own
authority.
If one is to follow the author in his line of thought, it only makes sense that the economy
was one of the most vital aspects for the Weimar government. As the end of World War One
marked Germany as a defeated nation and the Treaty of Versailles marked Germany as a guilty
party for the war, the successor state of the German Empire did not have much diplomatic sway.
In addition, the Treaty of Versailles also heavily limited the German military in all three
branches. As a result, the Weimar government only had the domestic front to prove to its citizens
that it was a strong and stable regime, in order to secure the state authority that it desperately
needed. Of course, as described earlier by William C. McNeil, the domestic economy of
Germany was heavily influenced by the actions of the United States, Great Britain, and France,
among other nations, and the Weimar government had to react to the demands of these states in
designing its own policies. Earlier works of history of focused on this aspect of the Weimar
economic policy, a method of focusing “on the question of constraints, with historians arguing
50

over the degree to which there was room for policy manoeuvre,” which again portrayed the
Weimar state as helpless and passive. In contrast, McElligott began his chapter, aptly named
51

“The Authority of Money,” with the government’s proactive decision of providing cheap
credits to manufacturers in order to stabilize the industry as the nation began to become adjusted
52

to peace. The use of the so-called Rentenmark as a transitional currency, according to the
author, also marked the government’s active approach to economic stability, as well as transition
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53

from material reparations to monetary ones to the victors of World War One. In order to
support his claims, McElligott made heavy use of statistics regarding the payment of war
reparations, including citing the calculations of Lujo Brentano, a German economist
54

contemporary to the Weimar Republic.

Of course, while Rethinking the Weimar Republic refrained from creating the Weimar
narrative around that of the rest of the world, it is also near impossible to mention international
pressure in the domestic policy making of the new republic government. However, despite the
pressure put onto the German government for quick payment of the reparations, the Weimar
republic was still not helpless, and actively responded to new situations. In particular, the
German government “employed a battery of delaying tactics, resisting reparations as far as it was
55

able to.” However, while a proactive act that displays the agency of the Weimar government,
the tension created from these tactics also greatly antagonized the French, which resulted in the
1923 occupation of the Ruhr region, which in turn helped fan the flames that would result in the
disastrous hyperinflation.
The author of Rethinking the Weimar Republic also focused on the era of economic
stability and perhaps even prosperity in the central years of the Weimar Republic, a half of a
decade usually not mentioned in studies of German economic history. McElligott corroborated
McNeil’s narrative regarding American capital influx during the interwar era, which helped the
56

Weimar government in creating the stability it enjoyed during this time. The relationship
between the Weimar economy and that of the United States, in time, would also end in chaos, as
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the collapse of the American stock market also resulted in the crash of the world economy, with
Germany taking a huge hit due to the importance of the Dawes Plan. However, the Weimar
government still altered economic policies in order to adjust to the changing situations leading up
to the Great Depression in order to appeal to business and property owners, despite it having
57

little effect. Even McElligott agrees, however, that the waning years of the Weimar Republic
saw Germany mostly influenced by the conflict between the Nazis and the Communists, with the
more central members of the parliament having little to do than stand in the sidelines against the
coming storm.
In his monograph, Anthony McElligott followed the von Rankean stream of
historiography, focusing intently on the German government in its dealings with the other
western states and in its domestic policies. While some social history is also present in order to
illustrate the success or failure of its decisions, it is mostly a work of political and diplomatic
history. In the “The Authority of Money” chapter, economic history was also heavily featured,
for obvious reasons. Rethinking the Weimar Republic primarily utilizes secondary sources, with
58

59

some primary sources including economic statistics and Joseph Goebbels’s diary to support
60

his own arguments. In particular, the author made reference to historian Detlev Peukert, who
discussed the rise of fascism and the fall of democracy in his monograph The Weimar Republic.
61

The Crisis of Classical Modernity, published in 1991.

In conclusion, Rethinking The Weimar Republic b y Anthony McElligott reexamines the
rise and fall of the Weimar Republic in a new light, not as a passive victim of the rise of Nazism,
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but as an active player that consciously fought to become a force of authority within the times of
chaos. As a result, the achievements of the Weimar government is recognized as its own efforts,
while the mistakes of the interwar government were recognized as its own in the downfall of the
short-lived German republic.
Finally, as McElligott had mentioned, the conflict between Communism and Nazism
characterized the waning days of the Weimar Republic. However, the divide between the left and
the right had long been a mark of interwar Germany, and saw its start at the revolutions during
the last years of World War One. Throughout the existence of the Weimar Republic, the same
conflict had taken many different forms, as the different factions varied between the remnants of
the German Empire to vanguards of the Nazi regime, and from Social Democrats to socialists
and Communists. Similarly, the form in which these conflicts took place also varied, from the
Reichstag p arliament to actual fightings within the streets. In 2009, historian Dirk Schumann’s
monograph Political Violence in the Weimar Republic 1918 - 1933: Fight for the Streets and
Fear of Civil War was published, focusing precisely on this thread throughout the existence of
the new republic.62 Both working against and providing a complement to McElligott’s analysis of
the Weimar government as an active force, Schumann characterized the political violence in
63

interwar Germany as “anachronism.” Specifically, the author described political violence as the
“exercise of physical coercion that essentially takes place collectively, can be aimed at both
objects as well as individuals or groups, and whose actors seek - by selecting a specific target - to
simultaneously strike a blow against the political system as a whole or against a political concept
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regarded as hostile.” According to Schumann, the end of the war “offered German society the
chance to pursue conflicts between class, interest groups, and ideological camps within
65

democratic forms,” an opportunity lost by the myriad of political chaos of the era.
In trying to understand the variety of political violence during the interwar era, Dirk
Schumann separated the fifteen years of the Weimar Republic into four stages: the early socialist
revolutions from 1919 to 1921, the political murders and political violence during the years of
the hyperinflation of 1922 and 1923, the relatively calm years between 1924 and 1929, and the
last years of the Weimar Republic from 1929 to 1933 as a Nazi Party attained full power and
66

defeated the German Communists both in the Parliament and on the streets.

Specifically looking at Schumann’s analysis on the years of hyperinflation, the author
characterized the political violence during the times of this economic crisis as “The Catastrophe
67

that Did Not Happen.” Although the chapter began with the collapse of the German currency,
the political violence that the author focused on really closely followed the assassination of
Walther Rathenau, the Jewish foreign minister of the Weimar Republic. Schumann noted that for
the first time, the radical right became the “target of repression and, for the first time, careful
68

surveillance by the authorities.” The Occupation of the Ruhr region, on the other hand, also
sparked nationalist and conservative factions within Germany, which serious clashes between the
right wing Stahlhelm organization a nd the union members that resulted in numerous injuries on
69

10 May of 1923. While the later Great Depression would end up polarizing the political scene
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to both sides of the spectrum, the German Communist Party quickly found out that it was not that
easy to mobilize the population, despite the surging prices that could have been a proponent
70

against the capitalist system that was responsible for the economic situation, and even the
71

strikes slowly petered out without much impact. Despite the social tension that was exacerbated
by the economic crisis, the same economic crisis also diminished the social tension to an extent
as the main concern for the German public was diverted to basic survival, “fracturing society not
72

along class lines, but into a multitude of smaller parts.”

As is expected, Political Violence in the Weimar Republic is a work of social history,
pitting various social classes and political groups against one another, in their struggle to gain
superiority in the new government and society. While interested in leading political figures to an
extent, Dirk Schumann mostly utilized them as catalysts for actions by the various groups,
instead of agents of great social change. Walther Rathenau, for example, was only a focus of this
book for the reactions of the left and right wings within the Weimar Republic to his murder,
while his personal political stances and actions were not pivotal to Schumann’s research. In
73

creating the narrative, Schumann made use of a multitude of police reports of political violence,
74

as well as official documents of the political groups engaged in such acts of violence.

While still a work of social history, Political Violence in the Weimar Republic differs
from that of David Abraham as it closely focused on the aspect of violence within the Weimar
Republic, while Abraham was more interested in the economy itself as well as industrial output.
Schumann’s work complements the existing literature regarding the economic crises within the
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Weimar Republic as it draws in a different approach to the unrest. Not only did the Weimar
government itself respond to the hyperinflation proactively, although influenced by both internal
and external factors, but the population itself also did not merely react to the coming crises
passively, but organized itself, protested, and even engaged in political violence to improve their
own chances of survival during this time of chaos and unrest.
Within the entirety of world history, the Weimar Republic might seem insignificant as it
only lasted for fifteen years, and its importance is often overshadowed by the German Empire
and Nazi Germany, regimes that participated in some of the most brutal wars in human history.
In the current state, the amount of scholarly work on the Weimar Republic dwarfs in comparison
to the books on Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, and oftentimes the history of the Weimar
Republic is used simply as a lead up to the rise of Nazism. However, the short-lived democracy
between two authoritarian regimes continues to be fascinating to many scholars, and the
complexity of the multiple economic crises undoubtedly still has much to offer to historians and
economists alike. With historians like Anthony McElligott still interested in examining the story
of the Weimar Republic and in understanding the same story through new and interesting lenses,
there is little doubt that future historians will continue to offer new narratives and new
explanations regarding the economic strife of interwar Germany.

31

Part 2: Primary Documents with Headnotes
Food Shortages of the 1920s
Despite the end of World War One, the German economy did not recover overnight. Instead,
food shortages and government controls continued to the interwar era, greatly affecting the
German population. In the following photograph taken around 1920, the whole family is shown
sharing a single sausage.

Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=4092
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Prices in Germany after the Hyperinflation
The hyperinflation in Weimar Germany had an immediate effect on the prices of everyday goods.
In the following text written in 1923 by Berlin journalist Friedrich Kroner and published by the
Berliner Illustritre Zeitung newspaper, the cost of living had increased significantly for the
German public. In this excerpt, the “mark” refers to the German currency, and “groats” refer to
grains.
Rice, 80,000 marks a pound yesterday, costs 160,000 marks today, and tomorrow perhaps twice
as much; the day after, the man behind the counter will shrug his shoulders, “No more rice.”
Well then, noodles! “No more noodles.” Barley, groats, beans, lentils—always the same, buy,
buy, buy. The piece of paper, the spanking brand-new bank note, still moist from the printers,
paid out today as a weekly wage, shrinks in value on the way to the grocer’s shop. The zeros, the
multiplying zeros! “Well, zero, zero ain’t nothing.”
They rise with the dollar, hate, desperation, and need—daily emotions like daily rates of
exchange. The rising dollar brings mockery and laughter: “Cheaper butter! Instead of 1,600,000
marks, just 1,400,000 marks.” This is no joke; this is reality written seriously with a pencil, hung
in the shop window; and seriously read.

Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3841
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Unemployment in the Aftermath of the Great Depression
In her autobiography published in 1964, Jewish artist Lea Grundig recalls the Great
Depression’s effect on Germany during the later years of the 1920s.
“The unemployed had to do a lot to get their benefits. They stood in endless lines in every kind
of weather at the unemployment office on Materni Street, between Stern Square and Post Square.
There we stood and waited until it was our turn.

The misery of years of unemployment had coloured everyone the same shade of grey. Work
qualifications, special abilities, skills and knowledge based on experience – these were all as
outmoded as vanished snow. The radiance and colour of particular occupations were lost in the
grey of welfare misery. Endless conversations, discussions, resigned grumbling and cursing,
simple, childish hopeful chatter, political arguments – all this was woven into the never-ending
talk of those standing in line.

Unemployment became a tragedy for many. Not only because of the poverty that mutely sat at
their table at all times. Not working, doing nothing, producing nothing– work that not only
provided food, but also, despite all the harassment and drudgery, was satisfying, developed
skills, and stimulated thinking; work, a human need – it was not available; and wherever it was
lacking, decay, malaise, and despair set in.
Source:
https://alphahistory.com/weimarrepublic/lea-grundig-recalls-the-great-depression-in-germany-19
64/
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Money used as Wallpaper
Taken in 1923, this photograph depicts the paper money in Weimar Germany being used as
wallpaper, due to the rapid devaluation of money.

Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=4161
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World War One Veterans Begging on the Streets

Wounded veterans of World War One returning home found it hard to find work to sustain
themselves after returning home, and the hyperinflation made their lives even harder. In the
photograph below, taken in 1923, shows one decorated (honored for his service, identified by
this medals) veteran begging on the streets of Berlin.

Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=4096
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Unequal Effect of Hyperinflation
The hyperinflation did not affect all members of German society alike. Those who had most of
their property in cash suffered more, while those with more non-monetary property (estates, for
example) were in comparison not hurt as much. As those with more estates and similar forms of
property were usually the rich, the class divide became even wider due to the hyperinflation. One
German expressed his frustration at the situation as such:
Of course all the little people who had small savings were wiped out. But the big factories and
banking houses and multi-millionaires didn't seem to be affected at all. They went right on piling
up their millions. Those big holdings were protected somehow from loss. But the mass of the
people were completely broke. And we asked ourselves, "How can that happen? How is it that
the government can't control an inflation which wipes out the life savings of the mass of people
but the big capitalists can come through the whole thing unscathed?" We who lived through it
never got an answer that meant anything. But after that, even those people who used to save
didn't trust money anymore, or the government. We decided to have a high-ho time whenever we
had any spare money, which wasn't often.

Source:
https://www.facinghistory.org/weimar-republic-fragility-democracy/economics/personal-account
s-inflation-years-economics-1919-1924-inflation
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The Dawes Report
After the stabilization of the German economy, an international committee was set up in 1924 to
create a new plan for collection war reparations from Germany. Led by American banker and
diplomat Charles G. Dawes, the committee assessed the German economy and issued the
“Dawes Report” to the Allied Reparations Commission. The following text an excerpt from the
report. In the passage, rentenmark refers to the German transitional currency, and the
Reichsbank refers to the German national bank.
Germany therefore is well equipped with the resources she possesses and the means of exploiting
them on a large scale. When the present credit shortage has been overcome she will be able to
resume a favored position of activity in a world where normal conditions of exchange gradually
are being restored. Without undue optimism it may be anticipated that Germany’s production
will enable her to satisfy her own requirements and to raise the amounts contemplated in this
plan for reparation obligations. The restoration of her financial situation and her currency, as
well as the world’s return to a sound economic position, seem to us the essential but adequate
conditions for obtaining this result.
We propose to deal in the first place with the currency problem. The present financial and
currency position of Germany is stated in Part II. It will be seen that by means of the rentenmark
stability has been attained for a few months, but on a basis which in the absence of other
measures can only be temporary. The committee proposes the establishment of a new bank of
issue in Germany or, alternatively, a reorganization of the Reichsbank as an essential agency for
creating in Germany a unified and stable currency. Such a currency, the committee believes, is
necessary for the rehabilitation of Germany’s finances, balancing of her budget and restoration of
her foreign credit.

Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=4417
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Unemployment Figures of the Weimar Republic
The following numbers trace the unemployment numbers in interwar Germany. 1924 saw the
stabilization of German economy, while the Great Depression began in 1929.
Unemployment in Germany, 1924-1932
1924

1928

1930

July 31, 1932

October 31, 1932

978,000

1,368,000

3,076,000

5,392,000

5,109,000

Sources: http://weimarandnazigermany.co.uk/unemployment-weimar-germany/#.XEY8lFz0lPY
With data from Statisches Jahrbuch (Statistical Yearbook), 1933.
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Price Fluctuation during the Depression
In contrast to the earlier hyperinflation, the Great Depression caused deflation, meaning that
prices lowered as the currency increased in its value. This phenomenon can be seen in the
following table. However, it should be noted, that while prices lowered, the purchasing power of
the German population did not increase. As unemployment surged, people could not find jobs to
pay for everyday items.
*In the following graph, the numbers are calculated based on the statistics from 1928, with 100
as the base number of that year. 102, for example, means that that statistic is 102% of the same
statistic from 1928. A consumer good that costs 100 marks in 1928, for example, would cost 98
marks in 1929, and only 67 marks in 1934.
Price/wages

1929

1930

1931

1932

1933

1934

Capital
goods

102

101

96

86

83

83

Consumer
goods

98

91

80

67

64

67

Cost of
living

102

98

90

80

78

67

Real wages

101

97

93

87

91

95

Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=4423
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Report of the Meeting between Adolf Hitler and Franz von Papen
On January 4, 1933, a meeting took place between Adolf Hitler and Franz von Papen, the
conservative former chancellor of Germany. Hoping to benefit from Hitler’s popularity, von
Papen proposed a political alliance that he believed surely would be under his control.Von
Papen assumed he could keep the upper hand in this relationship, as Hitler lacked political
experience. The meeting took place in the estate of banker Kurt Baron von Schröder in the city of
Cologne in western Germany, and the following testimony is excerpted from von Schröder’s
post-World War Two memoir.
On 4 January 1933 Hitler [and other leaders of the Nazi Party] arrived at my house in Cologne.
Hitler, von Papen and I went into my study where a two-hour discussion took place. Hess,
Himmler and Keppler did not take part but were in the adjoining room. [ . . . ] The negotiations
took place exclusively between Hitler and Papen. [ . . . ] Papen went on to say that he thought it
best to form a government in which the conservative and nationalist elements that had supported
him were represented together with the Nazis. He suggested that this new government should, if
possible, be led by Hitler and himself together. Then Hitler made a long speech in which he said
that, if he were to be elected Chancellor, Papen’s followers could participate in his (Hitler’s)
Government as Ministers if they were willing to support his policy which was planning many
alterations in the existing state of affairs. He outlined these alterations, including the removal of
all Social Democrats, Communists and Jews from leading positions in Germany and the
restoration of order in public life. Von Papen and Hitler reached agreement in principle whereby
many of the disagreements between them could be removed and cooperation might be possible.
It was agreed that further details could be worked out later either in Berlin or some other suitable
place.

Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3941
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Part 3: Textbook Critique
In World History: Patterns of Interaction, the 10th grade textbook for global history,
there is little information regarding the rise and fall of the Weimar Republic. In fact, there was
not even a single mention of the Weimar Republic within the chapter on the Treaty of Versailles.
The first time the Weimar Republic is mentioned in this book is in Section 2, “A Global
Depression” of Chapter 31, “Years of Crisis, 1919-1939.” While this section focuses on the
Great Depression of 1929 and its effect on a global scale, the Weimar Republic and the
hyperinflation was also briefly mentioned as one of the events leading up to the Depression.
Titled “Weimar Republic Is Weak,” the textbook laid out three reasons why the Weimar
government had serious weaknesses from the start. First, according to the textbook, Germany
lacked a strong democratic tradition. However, a parliamentary system had been in place in
Germany ever since the beginning of the German Empire in 1871. And although the Kaiser and
the chancellor held considerable power, the Reichstag had been very active even during World
War One, with Social Democrats and Communists arguing for and against the merits of
continuing the war, when during the same time other more established democracies were
weeding out dissidents as unpatriotic.
The second reason for the predestined failure of the Weimar Republic given out by the
textbook was that Germany had several major political parties and many minor ones, which in
itself is not necessarily a problem without further explanation. As any political party could be
represented nationally as long as they had any votes, it gave radical fringe movements the chance
to have their voices heard on a national scale, which was very much beneficial to the Nazi Party.
This oversight was rectified in the post-World War II West Germany (Bundesrepublik), whose
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constitution included a “five percent rule,” establishing a minimum proportion of total votes in
order to be represented in the parliament. However, while the number of parties represented in
the Bundestag d uring the Weimar Republic was indeed a weakness, it would be hard for students
to understand precisely why it was so, and especially in the current political environment of
polarization, students might even think that the multiplicity of political parties to be a benefit of
the Weimar regime, which could further complicate matters.
Finally, the textbook cited the negative attitude towards the new civilian government by
the German public for signing the Treaty of Versailles, which is an accurate statement that makes
sense without any further explanations. However, the Weimar Republic was not mentioned
anywhere previously, and not in the section regarding the Treaty of Versailles, which does not
seem like the optimal method of structuring the historical narrative. Furthermore, the origin of
the Weimar Republic was not touched upon anywhere in the textbook, and the Communist
revolution(s) as well as the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II were all absent, leaving the transition
from the German Empire to the Weimar Republic completely blank.
After setting the stage for the hyperinflation, the textbook offers a simple yet effective
summary of the phenomenon, as well as the Dawes Plan that was central to the economic
recovery. One detail I would like to add, however, is that the Dawes Plan was not completely
selfless, as Germany’s reparations to France and Britain (which required German economic
stability) were needed for the latter countries to pay back debt to the United States during World
War One.
The Weimar Republic was not mentioned until the chapter on the Great Depression and
the rise of Nazism, which is unfortunate. While factually correct and most likely not intentional,
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the structuring of the events makes the Weimar Republic seem completely chaotic throughout its
existence, with one economic disaster followed by another. The years between the two economic
crises saw Germany becoming relatively peaceful and prosperous, with the political center
holding strong, and new ideas flourished. Germany became a hub for liberal, progressive, ideas
and activities. The arts prospered, with numerous avant-garde art styles becoming much more
mainstream than ever before, and modernist German films revolutionized filmmaking in methods
that are still used to this day. While it makes sense that the textbook focused more on the rise of
Hitler and Nazism, it is a shame that these developments are ignored, and the depiction of the
Weimar Republic reduced it to a society of chaos and crisis.
In describing the events in Germany following the Great Depression, the textbook claims
that “Germans now turned to Hitler, hoping for security and firm leadership,” which is
inaccurate. While the Nazi Party did grow quickly following the second round of economic
crisis, it was not the only one to do so, as such unusual turn of events made both ends of the
political spectrum more appealing due to their proposed drastic measures. The Communist Party
also grew significantly, although slightly smaller in scale.
To summarize, while mostly factually accurate, the textbook structured the history of the
Weimar Republic as one of continuous disaster and unrest, and was not detailed enough in
certain areas to be clear enough for students to have a complete understanding of the era, and the
economic crises that was experienced by the people of interwar Germany.
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Part 4: Textbook Section Rewrite
[This first part would be placed in a new chapter by the name of “The Interwar Era.” This new
chapter follows the Treaty of Versailles chapter, and assumes that the abdication of Kaiser
Wilhelm II and the establishment of the Weimar Republic had already been covered in the
previous chapter]

Germany - The Weimar Republic
Early Woes
The Weimar Republic was the democratic government in Germany set up in 1919 after
the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Soon after its establishment, the new government faced a
considerable challenge in the form of an economic crisis.
World War One left Europe in ruins when the war ended in 1918. Throughout the 1920s,
the various European nations struggled to rebuild and recover from the catastrophic four years of
war. In contrast to the other European powers, Germany suffered more in some aspects, and less
in others. During the war, the British blockade of German waters created huge material shortages
within the German home front and caused starvation well until the early twenties. Furthermore,
Germany’s status as a defeated power also came with another economic burden. The German
economy did not miraculously recover in a day after the end of the war, and the need to pay for
reparations [refer to the previous chapter, “Treaty of Versailles”] only made matters worse. On
the other hand, as most of the fighting took place in France and Belgium, Germany suffered less
destruction. For example, Germany’s train tracks and factories remained mostly intact, unlike
those of France or Belgium.
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However, despite the many negative effects of the war, the overall German economy was
fairly stable, if not exactly prosperous. Germany made the first payment of war reparations in
late 1921. After that, the German currency (the Reichsmark) began to devalue steadily.
The Weimar government was stuck between two opposing requirements. On the one
hand, they needed to spend government funds to help the nation recover from the war. On the
other hand, the Treaty of Versailles’s terms required they make reparation payments to France
and Belgium. Sometimes they were late with making reparation payments. France and Belgium
became impatient with the payment delays. They too were desperate for funds to rebuild their
damaged roads, railroads, and factories. Hoping to directly extract the war reparations from
Germany themselves, French and Belgian military forces occupied Germany’s industrially rich
Ruhr river valley region early in 1923. This action proved to be widely unpopular among the
German population and government. The Weimar national government ordered what was
essentially a general strike in protest, which then resulted in the death of around 130 Germany
civilians for participating in passive resistance efforts in the hands of the French. As can be
expected, this whole ordeal also attracted international sympathy for the Germans, and criticism
against the French.
The French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr valley did not end until 1924, and the
actions of the Weimar government created even more economic problems. As the workers
ordered to go on strike by the Weimar government would not be paid by their job, the
government instead had to pay for the workers. The government managed to do so by printing
massive amounts of paper money, which only sped up the inflation that was already underway.
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Some historians also believe that the hyperinflation was deliberately created by the Weimar
Republic as a form of passive resistance against the French.
The value of the German Mark continued to plummet, and the cost of living rose
drastically and steadily for the common people. This phenomenon was known as hyperinflation.
“Rice, 80,000 marks a pound yesterday, costs 160,000 marks today, and tomorrow
perhaps twice as much.”
During the years of hyperinflation, it was not an uncommon sight to see wheelbarrows
full of money used to purchase a small number of basic groceries, or for paper bills to be used as
toy blocks, wallpaper, or even firewood, as the value of even the paper itself was more than the
amount printed on them.
The hyperinflation eventually came to an end in 1923,
after the Weimar government introduced of a new currency
known as the Rentenmark. Unlike the Reichsmark that was
plummeting in value, this new currency had its value directly
tied to the value of gold. As the price of gold generally
remains stable, the value of the Rentenmark w
 as also not
easily changed. Prices in Weimar Germany were reduced to
one-one trillion of the original prices (that is twelve zeros
removed!). One loaf of bread, for example, would cost
200,000 million marks in November of 1923, and dropped to
around 0.2 mark (or 20c) after the reform.
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Germany’s inability to pay reparations to the allied nations also proved to be a problem to
the United States. Although the United States entered World War One late in 1917, it provided a
significant amount of financial aid to the allied countries. The money that Britain and France
owed to the United States as of 1934 had not been paid back. If the Weimar Republic could not
pay war reparations, the allied nations could not pay back their debts to the United States. In
1924, the Dawes Plan spearheaded by American banker and diplomat Charles G. Dawes put an
end to the international crisis surrounding war reparations. France and Belgium forces pulled out
of the Germany and ended the Ruhr occupation, a step-by-step plan for reparations was
formalized, and $200 Million worth of loan was issued by the United States, in the form of Wall
Street bonds. With the influx of American capital, the Weimar Republic would be able to pay
war reparations, and the allied countries (such as Great Britain and France) could pay their debts
to the United States.
The five year period after the end of the hyperinflation, 1924 to 1929, was relatively
peaceful for Germany. With their livelihoods secured, German domestic society and politics
were at ease, and radical left-wing and right-wing organizations lost their appeal. The centrists
within the German parliament managed to hold the country together, forming an alliance with
moderate liberal and conservative groups. With economic and political stability, as well as an
influx of American capital, the Weimar Republic prospered, and it would seem that Germany
was on its way to full recovery from the horrors of World War One and the hyperinflation that
followed.
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[Here would be the section on the Great Depression, from the crash of the U.S. stock
market to its effects throughout the world, before going into specifically Germany and the rise of
the Nazi Party]

Due to the interconnected nature of the post-World War One global economy, the Great
Depression which began in 1929 caused tremendous ripple effects throughout the world. While
most nations attempted to find solutions through standard economic means, others turned toward
extreme political ideas to try to solve their problems.
In an earlier section, it was explained that the Weimar Republic of Germany had
recovered from the 1921-1923 hyperinflation and remained relatively stable for half a decade.
This new economic crisis - the global Great Depression - shook German society and politics
down to its very core. Radical left-wing and right-wing parties promised to end the problems
through quick and drastic measures, claiming that the Weimar government was too weak and
corrupt. The Communist Party and the Nazi Party gained popularity both in the parliament and in
the general public, with the Nazi Party becoming the largest political party in the 1932
parliamentary elections at 37%.
However, the Nazis could not form their own government with less than half of the total
votes, and they needed allies. Conservatives in the Weimar government hoped to benefit from
Hitler’s popularity, and convinced President von Hindenburg to appoint him as chancellor. The
traditional conservatives believed that they had the ability to keep the Nazis under their control,
as Hitler was inexperienced in national politics. They were greatly mistaken, and the Nazi Party
began to gradually take over the government, taking away power from both liberals and
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conservatives alike. In 1933, a lone Dutch Communist committed an arson attack on the German
national parliament (or the Reichstag), an incident that would be known as the “Reichstag Fire.”
Hitler and the Nazis quickly used this event as an opportunity to completely destroy the German
Communist Party, their most vocal and powerful political opposition. The Communist Party held
the most seats in Parliament of any other party except the Nazis. The Nazi government publicly
blamed the Communist Party for the arson attack, even though it had been done by an individual
without the Party’s approval or instruction. Within weeks of the arson attack, the Nazi-controlled
government suspended civil liberties for members of the Communist Party, arrested Communist
leaders, and effectively crippled the organization.
Later in the year of 1933, the Enabling Acts allowed Hitler and his government four years
of absolute power, to create and act on laws without the approval of the parliament, and to ignore
the constitution. The government under Hitler now had almost unlimited power, effectively
removed the parliament as a political entity, with only the president able to challenge them.
While Paul von Hindenburg, the president of Germany, had been consistently opposed to Hitler,
there was little he could have done to effectively keep the Nazis in check. And when he died in
1934, Hitler quickly abolished the position of both the presidency and the chancellorship,
combining them to create the title of Führer (leader) for himself as the supreme dictator of
Germany.
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